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1. Introduction
he U.S. government enacted the Banking Act of 1933, 
commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, at least 
partially to calm fears stemming from bank failures during the 
Great Depression. While there has been recent debate concern-
ing the historic realism of characterizing the banking industry 
structure as the cause of the financial crisis (Benston 1990), the 
perception of bank activities in the financial market as risky 
(Puri 1994), and the motivation of the legislators (Benston 
1996), the historical outcome of this legislation is clear. Glass-
Steagall placed a heavy regulatory burden on commercial banks 
by limiting their product array, the prices they could charge, 
and the types of firms with whom they could affiliate. In short, 
it restricted the activities in which banks may participate.
During the ensuing sixty-five years, this landmark piece of 
regulation has slowly become both outdated and untenable. 
Technological innovation, regulatory circumvention, and new 
delivery mechanisms all have conspired to make the 
restrictions of the act increasingly irrelevant. The first force of 
change—technology—permitted firms to create and recreate 
products and services in different ways than had been 
envisioned decades ago. The most obvious example is the 
transformation of the local mortgage loan market into the 
global securities giant it is today. Yet, one could equally cite the 
explosive growth of both derivatives and trading activity as 
areas where technology has transformed the very core of 
financial services (Allen and Santomero 1997).
Because of regulation, however, individual financial firms 
were still limited as to the scope of activities that were 
permissible. Commercial banks could not offer the full range of 
security investment services, investment firms could not offer 
demand deposits, and insurance firms were limited in terms of 
offering services beyond their own “appropriate” products. 
Many firms responded by circumventing regulation, either 
explicitly or implicitly (Kane 1999 and Kaufman 1996). Some 
more aggressive members of the fraternity simply acted in a 
manner not allowed by regulation in the hopes of either an 
innovative interpretation of the law (for example, NOW 
accounts or money funds) or formal regulatory relief (for 
instance, Citigroup). The results were almost always regulatory 
accommodation or capitulation. These decisions at times made 
economic sense (for example, the decisions on private 
placement activity or advisory services), but at other times they 
stretched the credibility of the rules, if not the English language 
(for instance, nonbank banks, the facilitation of commercial 
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paper placement, and mutual funds distribution). Yet, through 
this mechanism of regulatory evolution, the industry 
progressed. Banks were granted greater latitude in product 
mix, as well as permitted to form holding companies that 
expanded their operations further. At the same time, 
competition increased as the rules permitted new entrants that 
flourished in focused areas, such as GE Capital. Today, myriad 
financial services firms operating under different regulatory 
charters are competing in the broad financial marketplace.
The final force of change is the continual evolution of the 
delivery channels through which financial services are offered. 
This has occurred in many ways and in several stages. First, the 
use of postal services substituted for physical market presence; 
this was followed by increased use of telephones for both 
customer service and outbound marketing; and now personal 
computers and the Internet have altered the very balance of the 
financial industry. Throughout this period, the application of 
technology has disrupted the industry’s delivery paradigms and 
the traditional channels of service distribution. The combined 
use of new technology, conduits of distribution, and financial 
innovation has broadened the product offerings of all firms 
beyond their historic core businesses.
Nonetheless, by law, financial services firms of specific types 
continued to be expressly limited in their activities. Finally, the 
Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (FMA)—introduced on 
January 6, 1999, in the House of Representatives as H.R.10—
became law as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The bill’s stated 
purpose was “to enhance competition in the financial services 
industry by providing a prudential framework for the 
affiliation of banks, securities firms, and other financial service 
providers, and for other purposes.”
The potential ramifications of the FMA have been, and 
surely will be, continuously analyzed as the details of the 
enabling regulation emerge and the industry responds to its 
new perspective on firm structure and allowable activity 
(American Bankers Association 1999 and Stein and Perrino 
2000). Yet, the proponents of the FMA have already heralded 
its passage and argued that the legislation will result in more 
competitive, stable, and efficient financial firms, as well as a 
better overall capital market (Greenspan 1997). Detractors, 
and there have been some, claim that the new law will result in 
unfair business practices and less stable capital markets (Berger 
and Udell 1996).
In this contribution to the debate, we attempt to consolidate 
many of the arguments for and against the financial 
conglomeration that will inevitably follow the passage of the 
new law. We offer our view on the effects of this new 
competitive landscape on affected financial firms, as well as on 
the behavior of the capital market itself. Our focus is on the 
impact of the changing nature of both the market infra-
structure and the regulatory regime on the behavior and likely 
span of activity conducted by large financial firms. In the words 
of our title, now that firms can do everything, what should they 
do and why should regulators care?
2. Public Policy versus 
Firm-Level Effects
We have decided to look at the implications of the changing 
financial environment from two perspectives: a firm level and 
a public policy level. This dichotomy seems appropriate for a 
number of reasons. First, different market participants 
generally are interested only in one of these perspectives, and 
discussions among interested parties are generally more clear if 
the distinct points of view are clarified. On the one hand, 
economists will tend to focus almost exclusively on the market 
effects of the new regulatory and technological environment, 
and the impact that the shift in both of these important features 
will have on society at large and the interests of important 
subgroups. They may care very little about the impact of both 
the environmental effects outlined above and the new 
regulatory structure on individual firms. On the other hand, 
representatives of such firms may view these market effects as 
amorphous and of little interest to them and their 
organizations in the everyday working world. Their interests 
quite naturally will focus on the impact of the changing 
structure on their own competitive positioning.
However, we argue here that both perspectives are essential. 
The effect of the confluence of technology and regulatory 
change will have profound micro and macro effects on the 
financial sector. Participants in this debate must understand 
both aspects of the alteration of the financial environment to 
appreciate the change that is occurring in the financial sector. 
At times, the effects will be complementary; at other times, 
there will be distinctly different effects for different levels of 
analysis. For example, if the new environment results in a more 
competitive financial services industry, the public certainly will 
be better off, with less expensive and more abundant financial 
services. While this may be good for society, it may at the same 
time make individual firms worse off. Both industry members 
and policymakers need to appreciate these two distinct effects 
on the financial sector.
To the policymaker who claims indifference to the impact of 
these changes on the institutions that deliver financial services, 
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real economy by the financial sector is delivered by the firms 
and institutions that make up the industry. The impact of 
change on these entities can be ignored only at the policy-
maker’s peril. If firms cannot function—indeed flourish—the 
industry will not deliver on its essential role in the real 
economy. We have learned this the hard way (Bernanke 1983). 
Conversely, some changes may be less than salutary to the 
aggregate economy, even though they are beneficial to firms in 
the industry. In such cases, if the social cost of the changes 
taking place is of a sufficient magnitude, it may elicit—indeed 
require—a public policy response that could have severe 
consequences on the firms within the industry. We read the 
recent debate over the computer software industrial structure 
as just such a circumstance. While we take no sides in that 
dispute, its mere existence points to the need to analyze the 
effect of change on these two distinct levels.
3. Firm-Level Effects 
of Financial Modernization
Perhaps the best place to begin any discussion of the new 
financial landscape is with the impact of these changes on the 
operating scale of firms within the industry. In an industry that 
once thought that firms with $5 billion or $10 billion in assets 
were substantial, we are seeing the emergence of firms with 
trillion-dollar balance sheets. The obvious first question, then, 
appears to be the impact of size on various aspects of the 
business. Here, we consider five elements, or effects, of size, 
namely:
• What is the likely effect of size on bank operating costs, 
that is, the alleged benefit of economies of scale and 
scope?
• Can size of product offering affect revenues by 
permitting cross-selling, relationship pricing, and 
increased use of financial products in general?
• Will megafirms have a more competitive global position 
merely because some businesses require large balance 
sheets and large-scale commitments?
• Will firms be inherently more stable due to 
diversification and the sheer inertia of the core 
franchises?
• Will universal banks be susceptible to contagion effects, 
precisely because of their many operating businesses?
Turning to the first consideration, we note that several types 
of efficiency gains are thought to flow from the expansion of 
bank size and scope. Of these, increased operating cost 
efficiency is most commonly mentioned. The emergence of 
broad financial firms enables costs to be lowered, if scale or 
scope economies are relevant and if the range of the expansion 
is within the band whereby they can be achieved. This is not 
said to confuse the matter, but to enlighten it. The cost 
efficiencies of bank expansion are not likely to be monotonic. 
Size is not always a virtue! Scale may help for some levels of 
operation, while it might disadvantage other size ranges. At the 
same time, some lines of business benefit from scale while 
others may be hampered by it. The crucial issue in efficiency is 
the “right sizing” of the total firm and the “right sizing” of 
individual businesses within the firm.
Nonetheless, if average cost is decreasing in scale over the 
relevant range, as some suggest (Berger, Hancock, and 
Humphrey 1993 and Hughes and Mester 1998), larger 
institutions may be more efficient. In such a case, productivity 
of facilities and personnel can be improved by adding them to 
a larger organization. Examples of areas of potential gains 
include the physical branch distribution network, 
infrastructure software, electronic distribution systems in 
which marginal costs are negligible, and some niche processing 
businesses in which scale is a dominant success factor.
Beyond this, expenses may be lowered if the bank can offer 
several products at a lower cost than separate competing 
institutions offering a subset of the full product array (Berger, 
Hunter, and Timme 1993). According to this view, the evolving 
financial structure may enable larger banks to offer more 
products and services, and scope economies may allow 
providers of multiple products and services to produce them at 
a lower cost than their specialized predecessors. This will lead 
the former to garner an increase in market share of targeted 
customer activity at the expense of the latter (Thakor 1998).
For this to be relevant, there must be some scaleable asset 
that leads to the efficiency gain. Prime candidates include data 
on customer behavior and needs or a broad, underutilized 
distribution channel. Both benefit disproportionately from the 
added volume (Pulley and Humphrey 1993). The first rationale 
explains why there has been such intense interest in customer 
information, information systems, and data mining software. 
The economies of scale and scope of information are particu-
larly relevant here. Greater customer knowledge is likely to 
mean lower monitoring costs and better cross-selling, as many 
studies have illustrated (Mester, Nakamura, and Renault 1999).
However, the real gain may not be in production efficiencies 
but in customer service. In this case, the gain accrues not from 
technical efficiency of production, but from a kind of 
consumption economy. The result will be higher revenue and a 
better return from any customer segment, as consumers of 
financial services find it more advantageous to purchase 14 The Determinants of Success
multiple products from the same provider (Herring and 
Santomero 1990 and Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley 1996).
Combining both of these aspects of scale broadly defined, 
economists often refer to the total effect as improved profit 
efficiency (Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey 1993). The latter 
term refers to the ability of profits to improve from any of the 
sources noted above: cost, scope, or consumption economies. 
In a sense, it captures the total efficiency gains from scale 
without specific reference to the separately titled efficiency 
improvement areas.
The key issue here, however, is whether or not any of these 
gains are both real and substantial. Any of these reasons for 
gains is sufficient to herald the benefits of scale, and different 
ones presumably are relevant in different circumstances. 
Whether any of these gains are obtained or at least observable 
from past experience is another matter. To address this issue, 
the banking literature has examined both the cost structures 
across bank asset size and the cost effects of bank mergers 
in a number of different, hopefully complementary, ways 
(Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey 1997, Berger 1998, and 
Pilloff and Santomero 1998). Almost universally, the gains 
from strict cost efficiency are seen as illusory. Many reasons are 
offered for this lack of empirical evidence. The most compelling 
seems to be that product-specific cost efficiencies are offset by 
managerial or span-of-control issues. Many have argued that 
operating economies are likely to be lost as the organization 
grows too large and too complex. The classic reference here is 
Williamson (1985). In the context of the financial services 
industry, it is sometimes stated that when economies are found, 
they often arise in large specialized firms exploiting a single line 
of business, not in huge universal banks (Steinherr 1996).
The new environment will certainly allow U.S. banks to go 
into new lines of business. However, the commonly argued 
benefit of multiproduct distribution may not be enough to 
outweigh the costs, if most of these benefits accrue to more 
specialized firms. Gains in one line of business are often 
heralded, but the economic loss elsewhere in the firm causes 
cost savings to go unrealized in aggregate (Pulley, Berger, and 
Humphrey 1996 and Steinherr 1996).
By contrast, revenue gains appear real. The expanded 
product array and potential for cross-selling suggest that real 
revenue benefits result from larger size and depth of product 
offering. In fact, recent work suggests that this increased 
revenue potential accounts for a substantial portion of perfor-
mance increases for U.S. banks (Berger and Mester 1999).
Beyond direct operating efficiency, it is often argued by 
bankers that larger universal banks will benefit from financial 
modernization because the new financial services firms will be 
more innovative and offer new solutions to broad customer 
needs. Steinherr (1996) discusses this process, as opposed to 
product, innovation advantage that universal banks may enjoy. 
This comes from a desire and ability to reduce costs and to 
distribute products as efficiently as possible. However, Boot 
and Thakor (1996) argue against this alleged benefit of size. 
They note that financial systems that have always allowed 
universal banking have not traditionally had an advantage in 
product innovation. Rather, market-dominated systems, like 
the U.S. and British financial sectors, tend to be the leaders in 
product innovation. What is yet to be shown is whether 
systems that move from a market-dominated to a universal 
system can maintain their financial innovation.
Turning to the third advantage listed above, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the larger universal banks will become 
more competitive in some product markets where size matters. 
This increased competitive position could result from a 
number of the unique features of the wholesale banking 
market, where scale can be seen to enhance performance in two 
distinct ways. First, most large-scale financings require 
substantial book positions, which would be impossible in the 
absence of a large balance sheet. This is of increasing relevance 
today as the nonfinancial industrial structure consolidates 
globally. The latter trend has forced financial firms to increase 
the scale of their ownership positions in underwritings, 
syndications, and new issues. With the decline in the size of 
selling groups and increased pressure on comanagers (Smith 
2000), balance-sheet size becomes a comparative advantage, as 
does distribution capability, which is related to operating scale. 
Competitively, these are increasingly relevant issues.
Historically, European institutions have operated with 
the benefit of a universal banking charter. With further 
consolidation in Europe, resulting in, alternatively, country 
champions and pan-European competitors, U.S. bankers are 
understandably concerned about their ability to compete. 
Thus, it seems that allowing universal banking in the United 
States would place U.S. banks on a level playing field with the 
European institutions, and this is often listed as a second 
reason for enhanced financial performance.
However, using anecdotal evidence from Germany, some 
have pointed out that few universal banks are universal outside 
of their home country (Steinherr 1996). That is, a universal 
bank in Germany is likely to have a specialized, or more 
narrowly focused, banking operation outside of Germany, and 
almost never operates as a universal bank outside of its home 
market. So, the net benefit of universal banking, with respect to 
global competitiveness, is still not clearly understood. Does the 
fact that the home country allows for universal banks give its 
national banks a global advantage, even though they may not 
operate a universal bank in a foreign country? This question 
has no obvious answer and lacks empirical evidence in either 
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Next on our list of the benefits of scale, we have the issue of 
stability. It has long been a tenet of those who favor larger 
universal banks that such entities are, by definition, more 
diversified than their specialized counterparts. The argument 
is that the larger universal banks will benefit from higher 
earnings-source diversification (Denenis and Nurullah 2000), 
increased operating earnings stability (Santomero and Chung 
1992), and higher valuations (Boyd and Graham 1988). 
Assuming that each business line or geographic area is 
independent, the argument is so direct as to follow from the 
simple law of large numbers.
In addition, proponents of the stability argument assert that 
such broad product capability may permit better performance 
for more technical reasons as well. They extend the scope-
economies scenario above to reduced volatility by alleging that 
various synergies are involved in different but related 
businesses. Black (1975), for one, argues that the universal 
banks have better monitoring capacity, which will reduce the 
risk to the firm, an argument made by Fama as well (1980). 
Steinherr (1996) presents empirical evidence that universal 
banks “achieve a better risk-return tradeoff” and that universal 
banks have “reduc[ed] variability of income from lending 
activity.” Thus, the universal banks should be safer and less 
susceptible to insolvency.
Together, such benefits from earnings diversification, due to 
either broadening the geographic reach of an institution or 
increasing the breadth of products and services offered, may 
increase firm value in several ways. First, reduced risk directly 
translates into reduced probability of incurring distress costs. 
This is because the probability of insolvency or even a credit 
rating downgrade is reduced due to the diversification of 
business units under one corporate umbrella (Stulz 1984 and 
Santomero 1995). This, in turn, reduces expected funding costs 
and directly affects reported earnings. Second, if firms face a 
tax schedule that is less than strictly proportional, then reduced 
volatility will lead to a decline in the expected tax burden, 
raising expected net after-tax income (Gennotte and Pyle 1991 
and Santomero 1995). Third, earnings from lines of business in 
which customers value a bank’s reputation for stability may be 
increased. Some areas of activity, such as standby letters of 
credit, require a premier rating and a conservative reputation 
to be a credible competitor. Finally, the firm may be able to 
increase the level of some risky, yet profitable, activities such as 
commercial lending without additional capital being necessary 
(Saunders and Walter 1994).
However, these arguments in favor of scale can be taken too 
far. In fact, there are at least three reasons to suggest that the 
broader franchise results in a less stable firm. The first argues 
that the consolidated entity has a franchise value and brand 
name that are intimately intertwined with all of its businesses. 
Therefore, a bad outcome in any one may have a magnified 
effect on all the lines of business and the core franchise itself. If 
this is the case, then the association of the bank with any high 
variance line of business has a potentially detrimental effect on 
the entire franchise. In fact, conglomeration may increase 
instability, as the firm’s name suffers when “even the least of 
your brethren” is subject to a shock.
Second, the usual discussion of activity expansion is 
presented under the assumption of relatively uncorrelated 
business units. In all likelihood, however, the correlations are 
apt to be highly positive. Activities are added to the firm 
because of a perception of management that the firm has a 
comparative advantage in producing the underlying product or 
assessing the underlying risk. Real estate lenders have gone into 
real estate development, at times with disastrous effects. Third-
world lenders have become emerging market trading houses 
with little better luck. This should not be a surprise. Firms 
attempt to find their comparative advantage or value-added 
capabilities. So, as a direct result, affiliates are related 
businesses at some level, which may well result in high positive 
correlations in times of stress.
Finally, it is important to consider the regulatory 
environment that is likely to pervade new business ventures. 
Bankers and their regulators usually assume the supremacy of 
lead bank regulators over foreign country regulators or those in 
charge of other parts of the financial sector. However, in the 
event of a crisis, the local regulator—be it the state insurance 
commissioner or the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC)—will not sit idly by and allow a retrenchment of bank 
funds and commitments of support. Furthermore, they are 
likely to be strident at exactly the time when the holding 
company and/or its lead bank is experiencing trouble. This line 
of reasoning does not support the diversification arguments 
made above. To the contrary, the new organizational form 
permitted by regulation may well be subjecting the financial 
firm to greater distress costs when any one of its operating 
subsidiaries has difficulty. It is quite possible that a financially 
distressed subsidiary will cripple the entire entity.
4. Does One Size Fit All?
Taken at face value, the balance of costs and benefits associated 
with a broader product array seems to favor the more universal 
financial franchise. The benefits of scale and/or scope, the 
revenue enhancements, the bigger playing field, the potential 
for greater innovation, and the added stability all favor the 
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however, are not unequivocal. There are real concerns over 
complexity, complacency, and fragility of franchise. None-
theless, the observed trend toward broader firms seems to be 
supported by our analysis of the factors influencing change.
The Limits on Consolidation
This has led some to voice the concern that all financial firms 
will become huge universal banks. Will the financial services 
industry eventually become dominated by a small number of 
these behemoths? We think not. Countervailing the positive 
pressures toward universality are forces that have permitted 
more narrowly focused firms to survive and flourish even 
where universal banking has long been a reality.
Four key features of the universal firm place limits on the 
megabank and its ability to add market share indefinitely. 
These argue in favor of the ability of small firms to remain 
competitive. The issues of managing diverse firms in different 
markets and different geographies are not trivial. The 
innovation that has traditionally come from small firms is not 
lost here, notwithstanding the arguments in favor of the 
potential for innovation in larger organizations. In addition, 
incentive compatibility issues all speak in favor of the survival 
of small firms. Especially today, small firms seem quite capable 
of finding a niche as more focused competitors.
Finally, regulation may also support this argument. The 
advent of the Financial Services Holding Company contains 
considerable baggage. The oversight by the Federal Reserve, so-
called “Fed Lite,” is unlikely to be lite. Existing regulators in 
other areas—including insurance regulators in the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners, the SEC, and the 
foreign regulators—could create a situation in which many 
participants find it unprofitable to pursue universal product 
offerings. Some firms will find it too burdensome to become 
too big. The gains in efficiency, scope economies, and other 
areas may be swamped by the excessive regulatory cost.
If the burdens of oversight spring from legitimate public 
policy concerns (discussed below), this is the right outcome 
and it is socially optimal. However, if the burdens are the result 
of a lack of efficient oversight and regulatory turf wars, society 
as a whole loses as a result of the excessive burden of regulation.
Choosing a Method of Expansion: 
Acquisition or Entry?
Some firms will become large universal banking firms in spite 
of the regulatory burden. These firms will be able to exploit the 
synergies between the operating units in such a way that the 
regulatory cost will be swamped by the aforementioned 
advantages. The next decision that such firms will face is the 
choice of methods to achieve product line expansion. There are 
two possible approaches we will focus on here: expansion 
through acquisition or new entry.
Every organization contemplating product line expansion 
must weigh the relative desirability of entry methods. It may 
enter by purchasing an existing firm or by establishing an 
entirely new firm or subsidiary. This decision will depend on 
several factors:
• the nature of the new business and its relationship to 
existing capabilities,
• the start-up costs involved, in terms of initial capital, 
technology platform, and unique infrastructure or 
distribution requirements,
• the nature of the brand name or franchise value required 
for market penetration.
The method used to extend product offerings into a new 
channel or to offer a greater product array will depend most 
importantly on the relationship of the new product area to the 
existing businesses of the firm. As a general matter, a closely 
related new activity favors new entry over entry through 
acquisition. For this reason, commercial banks traditionally 
have found it easier to enter directly into investment banking, 
where the synergies between a commercial and investment 
bank in terms of investment and credit analysis favored 
expansion over acquisition. However, the new emphasis on 
distribution and special product knowledge may be changing 
this perception as recent acquisitions suggest—for example, 
Fleming by Chase, and Bankers Trust by Deutsche Bank. The 
perceived need to acquire specific product knowledge is also 
the case for entering into the insurance industry. Actuarial 
science is a relatively new field for banking institutions. Thus, 
mergers between commercial banks and insurance companies 
appear more likely.
Purchasing an existing firm has several advantages. First, the 
start-up costs are lower. A target company has already made 
the necessary infrastructure investment, and technology is 
increasingly seen as a major barrier to entry. In addition, the 
purchased firm is a going concern, with a customer base that 
can be leveraged and cross-sold into other products—for 
example, the recent Citigroup and Schwab acquisitions. To the 
extent that this is specific capital, the purchase of an existing 
firm is preferred to assembling the capability piecemeal. 
Furthermore, to the extent that these benefits are somewhat 
unique to a single partner, the market price of the acquired 
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substantial synergy capabilities. However, taking over an 
existing firm requires adaptation and a particular set of 
management challenges. If the two cultures clash, the whole 
venture will suffer, and the specific know-how of the acquired 
firm will be dissipated by the acquisition process itself.
The third advantage of pursuing an acquisition strategy, as 
opposed to de novo entry, is the fact that the existing firm may 
have a valuable asset, such as brand recognition, beyond the 
acquirer’s existing customers. The target company as a going 
concern is potentially already established in the industry, with 
known capability and an existing customer base. This is 
especially important when purchasing a firm far from the 
acquirer’s existing product offering and reputation area. 
Purchasing a firm gives instant credibility and access.
By contrast, in closely allied product areas, the acquiring 
firm is already well established and the opportunities that come 
with another brand name are not as desirable. Thus, building a 
new subsidiary is not as difficult and the franchise value of the 
existing firms is not as valuable to the acquirer. It therefore 
appears more likely that a firm whose core business is similar to 
the target area will create its own operations through internal 
expansion.
Choosing a Method of Expansion: Alliances?
However, there is the middle ground of alliances, whereby 
firms can expand capability in a manner short of direct 
ownership. On the surface, this presents a viable alternative to 
either buying or building. In addition, this should substantially 
reduce the regulatory costs associated with extending the firm’s 
range and reach.
Using alliances is seen as a fertile middle ground for industry 
product expansion (Dyer and Singh 1998). In fact, alliances 
have been an effective means of expansion in both the 
nonfinancial and financial sectors. However, as noted in the 
management literature, such arrangements achieve their 
desired outcome only when alliance partners truly commit to 
the partnership. Interested firms must combine or invest in 
idiosyneratic assets, knowledge, and/or capabilities to leverage 
complementary resource endowments. This creates a real 
governance challenge. To quote Parkhe (1993, p. 301), 
“strategic alliances are frequently subject to high instability, 
poor performance, and premature dissolution” as a result.
This has been the case in financial services, where, in most 
instances, alliances have proved rather temporary. The 
examples include the cash management account, private label 
proprietary mutual funds, and annuity distribution 
agreements. These experiences, among others, point to the 
transitory nature of intraindustry alliances and joint 
distribution agreements. This may not be the case for alliances 
with vendor organizations, such as technology firms, where 
partnerships have proved more durable. Nonetheless, most see 
alliances as transitory agreements that lack permanence and 
forestall a long-run decision on entry.
The Resultant Industrial Structure?
The next logical question is whether or not any one of these 
models of firm structure is stable. Will the industrial structure 
be one of only huge universal banks? In time, will the niche 
players ultimately acquiesce and join larger organizations? Or, 
will the universal financial firm devolve, as the conglomerate 
industrial firm did in the 1960s (Bhagat, Schleifer, and Vishney 
1990)? Will our children see the resurgence of the partnerships 
and small securities firms that populated Wall Street forty years 
ago? Will Main Street see the return of local banks and regional 
brokers?
 It seems most likely that there will be a mix of specialized 
firms and universal firms. There appears to be no economic 
force majeure that will lead to a single firm type, and, by 
extension, it seems likely that there will always be room for 
specialized firms. However, history suggests that alliances have 
not been a stable industrial form. There is no reason to expect 
that this will change in the future.
At the same time, we do not expect to see the massive spin-
off of divisions in the financial sector, which occurred as raiders 
spun off and broke up the industrial conglomerates of years 
past. To us, there is a clear distinction between the random 
collection of unrelated businesses that represented the 
industrial conglomerate and the emergence of the universal 
financial firm (Bhagat, Schleifer, and Vishney 1990). The latter 
is rooted in the belief that the firm has generic capabilities, 
including either financial asset management and/or unique 
customer knowledge. The target customer group may be 
defined by type (for example, wealthy individual or large 
corporate) or by distribution channel (for example, branches 
or the Internet). In any case, the strategy is not a simple 
diversification play, but an interest in capitalizing on specific 
capabilities across the financial industry.
It certainly is possible that the financial supermarkets can 
garner a majority of the market share from the specialized 
firms. This trend is already present in the data on ten- and 
twenty-firm concentration ratios in the banking, underwriting, 
asset management, and insurance industries (Santomero and 
Babbel 2000). However, if the universal firms gain a majority of 
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industry. For the reasons outlined above, the niche player 
remains a credible competitor in all but the narrowest of 
product lines.
Conversely, the universal bank model can succeed only if it 
can adequately address the contagion concerns expressed 
above. Recall that the last restructuring of the financial sector 
was a direct result of systemic concerns. The perception that 
the franchise of the broad financial firm is intertwined with its 
operating units suggests that a failure or crisis in any one unit 
will drag the entire company down with it.
Regulators worry about this issue and have attempted to put 
in place sufficient firewalls to keep the operating units separate. 
However, this often results in a loss in efficiency, as such legal 
structures and regulations increase operating costs and raise 
the minimum price of services provided. In the limit, such 
restrictions reduce the market share of regulated firms and shift 
the activity to unregulated competitors or institutions from less 
regulated regions of the world who are vying for the same 
customer’s business. And, such regulations and organizational 
restrictions may not even address the real problem. The issue of 
contagion is more than a matter of legal separation. It involves 
reputation and brand name, which suggests that adverse 
publicity associated with a major firm transcends the legal 
structure of the firm and goes directly to future revenue 
potential. For this reason, the market will not be assuaged by 
neat legal separation.
5. Implications for Public Policy
This is perhaps an appropriate place to introduce the public 
policy concerns. In fact, some have suggested that regulators 
and policymakers have a clear stake in large financial firms 
because universal banks are susceptible to contagion effects. 
Beyond this, however, other reasons are offered for regulatory 
oversight and intervention. The four major public policy 
concerns usually expressed include:
• the above-mentioned argument of systemic stability 
concerns,
• an opposite concern over an extension of the 
government safety net to these broad financial firms,
• the impact of consolidation and convergence on the 
concentration of power, in several manifestations, and
• the age-old concerns over conflicts of interest and 
predatory business practices.
Little can be added to the discussion of the first point. If one 
believes that systemic risk is increased rather than decreased by 
the extended financial firms, this implies a stronger role for 
regulation in the sector. This has led to a call for the full array 
of regulatory oversight, prudential regulation, and careful 
separation of financial activities contained in the holding 
company. This is the very essence of the arguments in favor of 
standard regulation (Herring and Santomero forthcoming) 
and the Federal Reserve position in the debates on H.R.10. 
Conceding a role for regulation in the financial sector, the issue 
here is whether the emergence of the universal financial firm 
exacerbates the stability concerns of regulators.
It appears that it does. By virtue of the fact that the financial 
firm is engaged in many financial activities, there is an increase 
in the probability of some form of financial distress within the 
combined entity that would extend to the holding company 
and its subsidiaries. In short, something is likely to go wrong 
somewhere in the franchise, and this could be destabilizing to 
the firm, the entire sector, and the economy at large.
The counterargument is that the additional diversification 
present in these firms will dampen volatility, rather than 
exacerbate it. This is clearly true for small changes in economic 
performance from quarter to quarter. However, as the Asian 
crisis illustrated (Diebold and Santomero 1999), correlations 
tend to increase in crisis episodes. This renders standard 
diversification measures less useful in times of financial 
distress. For this reason, regulators have been legitimately 
concerned about the growth of large universal firms and their 
effect on macroeconomic stability. The solution, of course, is 
central bank intervention.
However, the expectation of central bank intervention has 
its own problems, as Karaken and Wallace (1978) pointed out 
some twenty years ago. Regulation leads to the expectation of 
government intervention, which permits the market to 
relegate risk control to the central bank. This, of course, leads 
to a problem of government-induced moral hazard. One need 
look no further than the savings and loan scandal in the 1980s 
to highlight the existence of government-induced moral 
hazard and to note that it is not an artifact of universal 
banking.
The advent of universal firms, however, exacerbates this 
problem in two ways. First, the increased size of the financial 
firm makes government intervention a virtual certainty, 
notwithstanding the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). No reasonable market 
participant could question the importance of one of these 
financial conglomerates. So in time of crisis, there is little 
question of support by the Federal Reserve. In addition, 
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government-induced moral hazard can manifest itself. Boyd 
explains how government-induced moral hazard manifests 
itself in the universal banking system and how it can be passed 
down to nonbank subsidiaries owned by universal banks.
This will create both the appearance and the reality of a 
double standard between big and small firms in the financial 
sector. Some would argue that such a standard already exists, 
with some firms viewed as “too big to fail” and others “too  
small to save” (Cole and Gunther 1994). The evolving financial 
institution structure will exacerbate this distinction. Some 
authors speculate that this will result in an extension of the 
government safety net to other types of financial firms. We 
hope and trust that this will not be the outcome. Nonetheless, 
the present situation represents an unlevel playing field, 
wherein some bank-owned subsidiaries may appear guaran-
teed by the federal government. Greenspan (1997) has recently 
argued that bank holding companies may be able to pass 
cheaper borrowed funds along to subsidiaries, to create an 
additional unfair competitive advantage.
In the end, this may all lead to a large taxpayer bill, as these 
huge firms become too big to fail. These firms may become 
financially troubled and require an expensive government 
bailout that could eventually cost taxpayers money. At the very 
least, the Treasury Department has entered into the derivatives 
business by writing a large number of “puts” on the financial 
conglomerates operating within its jurisdiction.
A somewhat different concern relates to the sheer size of 
these megafirms and the implication that this might have for 
the economy as a whole. As these new financial firms emerge, 
some policy experts worry that economic power in the financial 
markets may become so concentrated that such firms could 
manipulate or at least affect the whole financial sector, to the 
detriment of the economy as a whole. Even unwittingly, they 
may unilaterally affect the flow of capital in particular 
directions that could have a substantial impact on specific 
segments of the economy.
These concerns have several concrete manifestations. As 
large firms begin to be the major providers of all financial 
products, consumer advocates have expressed concern about 
credit availability and equal access to all members of the 
economy. Consolidated products, limited access to credit for 
low-income groups, and predatory lending are all seen as part 
of the process of consolidation (Benston 1994 and Berger and 
Udell 1996).
There has been particular concern over credit availability for 
small firms. Small businesses are crucial to the economy—
especially local economies—and if their access to capital is 
diminished by the emergence of these large financial firms, the 
public will suffer. The amount of credit available to small 
businesses is viewed as so important to the political process that 
FDICIA mandated regular reporting to Congress of the 
amount of credit available to small businesses.
Recently, some criticism has been directed against large 
commercial banks for their reduced lending to small businesses 
and for being equally strict when dispersing capital to local 
governments (Berger and Udell 1992). This issue has also 
received attention because the recent empirical studies suggest 
that the concern is real and verifiable. Berger and Udell 
investigate this issue and find that “as banks become larger and 
more complex, they may become less inclined to supply credit 
services to small businesses.”
The only real answer to these concerns is competition, 
brought about by free entry in open markets. Inasmuch as 
various members of the financial community are expanding 
their product array and increasingly using the Internet as a 
financial product distribution channel, one should expect that 
industry participants will seek profit opportunities no matter 
where they are. As long as access to the consumer and small 
business markets is open, there appears to be little reason for 
concern. Beyond this, one must remember the unique financial 
structure of the U.S. market. Banking institutions play a 
relatively small role in the sector, unlike their dominant role in 
Germany and Japan (Allen and Santomero forthcoming). 
Therefore, as long as competitors from any part of the financial 
sector have access to the market, there is little reason to expect 
that resources will not find their way to fertile profit 
opportunities.
Finally, there is the concern that conglomerates may use 
unfair business practices to the detriment of the consumer. By 
this theory, mergers may be motivated, in part, by attempts to 
increase market power (Amel and Rhoades 1989). Proponents 
of this view point out that deals among financial firms with 
substantial geographic overlap reduce the number of firms in 
markets in which both organizations compete. A related effect 
of in-market mergers is that the market share of the surviving 
organization increases. These changes in market structure 
make the affected markets more vulnerable to reduced 
competition. The increased market power of the surviving 
organization may enable it to earn higher profits by raising loan 
rates and lowering deposit rates. The bank regulation literature 
offers ample evidence of the relationship between structure and 
performance (Wolken and Rose 1991). To the extent that a 
local market can be exploited by a merger, that literature 
suggests that the potential gain could be substantial.
It should be noted that antitrust policies of the Federal 
Reserve and the Department of Justice are designed to prohibit 
mergers with substantially anticompetitive effects (Berger and 
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preferred solution to such competitive concerns in local 
markets. This has become increasingly true as the relevant 
market definition for most financial products has become 
increasingly national, if not global, due to the new technology 
of delivery. In fact, it is best to think of all financial product 
markets as global, rather than local.
Additionally, concerned parties offer a list of predatory 
practices and nefarious acts that may arise from consolidation. 
Walter (1997) points out six such conflicts that have been 
suggested as potential conflicts of interest in universal banking:
1) salesman’s stake,





The first of these occurs when a broker gives inappropriate 
advice when selling products offered by affiliates. The second 
occurs when an underwriting institution places investments 
into an affiliate that it is unable to sell in the open market. The 
third occurs when a bank has private information on the 
bankruptcy risk of a debtor and encourages the distressed 
firm to issue other securities to pay off affiliate debt. The 
fourth and fifth conflicts occur when the firm inappropriately 
packages products with cross-subsidies. Such tie-ins are said 
to be a result of a firm using its power in one market to 
“encourage” the client to purchase a second product from an 
affiliate. The final source of these conflicts is said to occur 
when one division or line of a business can relay private 
information on the financial situation of a client to another 
division in an effort to gain competitive advantage and 
unique price-setting power.
Many of these alleged abuses are the direct outgrowth of the 
synergies available from a universal bank, which can use the 
information gathered to serve its clients better. It is a 
manifestation of the economies of scope discussed above 
available to such firms. It is not at all clear that forbidding such 
information sharing and cross-subsidies is detrimental to the 
consumer and to overall credit availability.
Yet many opponents of financial modernization are 
convinced that financial conglomerates will use their size and 
power to take advantage of the consumer, using one or more of 
these mechanisms. To alleviate these potential problems, 
universal banks will almost certainly have to be exposed to 
further oversight in these matters.
However, as noted above, the real solution to these concerns 
is the assurance of full disclosure and sufficient competition 
from other service providers to impose market discipline. If the 
customer has options, then the potential of informed suppliers 
looking at all of the customer’s financial needs need not be very 
worrisome.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have consolidated many of the arguments for 
and against the financial conglomeration that is occurring in 
the U.S. financial market. We offered our view of the effect of 
this new competitive landscape on affected financial firms, as 
well as on the behavior of the capital market itself. Our focus 
was on the impact of the changing nature of both the market 
infrastructure and the regulatory regime on the behavior and 
likely span of activity conducted by large financial firms.
We looked at the implications of the changing financial 
environment from two perspectives: a firm level and a public 
policy level. After a review of the firm-level issues, we 
concluded that the balance of costs and benefits associated with 
a broader product array seems to favor the more universal 
financial firm franchise. The benefits of scale and/or scope, the 
revenue enhancements, the bigger playing field, the potential 
for greater innovation, and the added stability all favor the 
observed movement toward universal firms. The results, 
however, are not unequivocal. There are real concerns over 
complexity, complacency, and fragility of franchise.
This does not, however, imply that all firms will be universal 
or that all niche firms are in trouble. It seems most likely that 
there will be a mix of specialized firms and universal firms. 
Nevertheless, we know that alliances have not been of a stable 
form, and there is no reason to expect that this will change 
going forward.
The advent of universal firms, however, exacerbates the 
regulatory challenges. First, their increased size makes 
government intervention virtually certain. This may well create 
both the appearance and the reality of a double standard 
between big and small firms in the financial sector.
The only real answer to these concerns is competition, and 
the increased competition that free entry and open markets 
bring. Inasmuch as various members of the financial 
community are expanding their product array, one should 
expect that these new entrants will seek profit opportunities no 
matter where they are. Therefore, as long as competitors from 
any part of the financial sector have access to the market, there 
is little reason to expect that resources will not find their way to 
fertile profit opportunities. As long as the consumer and small 
business markets are open, there appears to be little reason for 
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